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Abstract
Children may receive monetary transfers from their parents to realize the dream of
homeownership. This raises the question of whether transfers received decrease if gov-
ernments also provide a homeownership-related subsidy. The purpose of this paper is to
empirically examine this question, using a sample of the Japanese home-buying households
that are subsidized by a mortgage tax deduction (MTD) as a model case. In the empiri-
cal stage, we o¤er a test of the e¤ect of the MTD on both the extensive (the probability
of receiving transfers) and the intensive (the amount of transfers received) margins us-
ing the overall sample as well as subsample groups. The empirical results, which use the
full sample, appear to indicate that the MTD has a tendency to crowd out transfers on
both the extensive and the intensive margins. Subsample analysis demonstrates that the
crowding-out e¤ect is strengthened when parents behavior is inuenced by a relatively
strong altruistic motive and a relatively weak exchange motive.
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1 Introduction
Parents tend to assist their adult children to realize the dream of homeownership. Because a
conventional mortgage requires a large down payment, home-buying households usually accu-
mulate substantial savings, and thus down payment constraints may distort optimal housing
consumption. Parental transfers are likely to alleviate this borrowing constraint. Children,
however, can realize a house purchase when the government implements public transfer pro-
grams earmarked toward prospective home buyers, because these also alleviate the borrowing
constraint of children.1 The question is then whether parents provided additional nancial
assistance under this condition.
Some recent studies have indicated that additional nancial assistance is not o¤ered fre-
quently. Namely, these studies have suggested that public transfers tend to crowd out private
transfers. However, these are unrelated to housing issues as they are from children to parents.
For instance, Juarez (2009) estimated that an increase in the income of senior people, caused
by the nutrition transfer program in Mexico City, is negatively related to the amount of private
transfers they receive. Gerardi and Tsai (2010) found that an increase in government transfer
payments, caused by the introduction of social programs in Taiwan, decreased the likelihood
of senior parents receiving monetary support from their children.2
Inspired by the crowding-out hypothesis, this paper empirically tests how housing subsidy
schemes designed to encourage homeownership, a¤ect the receipt of transfers on both the
extensive (the probability of receiving a positive transfer from parents) and the intensive (the
transfer amount conditional on it being positive) margins. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the rst paper that applies the idea of the crowding-out e¤ect to the housing market. We use
Japan as a case study, which is an interesting setting, because it includes a time period during
1For instance, the home mortgage interest deduction (MID) in the US lowers the amount of tax collected
from households. Thus, the US government believes that these transfers encourage homeownership. Glaeser
and Shapiro (2003), however, found evidence against this claim: the subsidy created by the MID has little e¤ect
on homeownership rates. Hanson (2012) also found no relationship between the MID and homeownership. His
empirical results, however, suggested that the MID increases the size of the homes purchased.
2Kohli (1999) tried to refute the crowding-out e¤ect, because public transfers and private transfers may in-
teract and complement each other. Kohli (1999) found that the public pension transfers to seniors are channeled
back to younger generations through family transfers.
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which the government provided housing incentives such as the mortgage tax deduction (MTD).
This government program may have the same type of impact as public transfers because it
alleviates housing nancial pressures by increasing the disposable income of children. Using
household-level data on purchases of detached houses in the urban areas of Japan that contains
information on monetary transfers from senior parents to adult children, and household-level
di¤erences in the availability of the MTD as the parameters, we are able to estimate the e¤ect
of the MTD on transfers received. The empirical results demonstrate evidence of crowding out
on both the extensive and the intensive margins. In particular, the estimates of the intensive
margin suggest a strong crowding-out e¤ect. We also divide the sample into two groups based
on sociodemographic characteristics: childrens income (whether household income is less than
the 25th percentile or not), childrens age (whether householders are below 40 years of age
or not), previous tenure (whether children dwell in rental housing before owning a house or
not), and living arrangements (whether children dwell with their parents or not), and conduct
the same exercise. We believe that an estimation for each sample allows us to understand
di¤erences in parental transfer motives to some degree. Indeed, the empirical results for the
subsample analysis appear to indicate that the degree of crowding-out may di¤er between
subsamples.
2 Theoretical framework of crowding out
To address this question, it is useful to examine the parental motive behind transfer deci-
sions. Engelhardt and Mayer (1994) demonstrated that prospective home buyers who face
high house prices or households with delinquent credit are more likely to receive transfers for
home purchases, because these households are more likely to be nancially constrained. Cir-
man (2008) obtained a similar result. That is, parental transfers for acquiring a residential
property increase when both housing prices and interest rates are relatively high. Cirman
(2008) concluded that transfers can act as an informal source of housing nance and play a
cushioning role in terms of harsh market conditions. These results suggest that parents have
an altruistic preference (Barro 1974; Becker 1974): parents care about the well-being of their
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children, and therefore parents help their children when they are confronted with a deteriora-
tion in housing-related conditions. When adult children receive gifts from their parent, they
may realize the dream of owning a home (Helderman and Mulder 2007). These results, how-
ever, suggest that parents are less likely to increase transfers when their children are placed
in a favorable environment for acquiring a home. This appears to indicate that the MTD,
which provides subsidies to increase childrens income, has a tendency to crowd out parental
transfers.
Many studies in relation to intergenerational transfers, however, have suggested parents
are more likely to possess an exchange motive rather than an altruistic motive (e.g. Bernheim
et al. 1985). That is, parents tend to enter an agreement with their children whereby their
adult children agree to provide a service in exchange for receiving gifts. According to Cox
(1987), under the exchange motive, parents should increase their transfers to induce childrens
attentions, especially from wealthy children whose opportunity costs are relatively high, if the
parentsdemand of childrens attention is inelastic. For example, let us consider a case where
a formal care market is not operating well in the parentsneighborhood. In this situation,
parents can only rely on the informal care because no close market substitutes exist. Con-
sequently, the parentsdemand for childrens informal care becomes inelastic. The exchange
model then predicts that parents encourage transfers when their children have easier access to
home ownership. This suggests that the exchange motive behind transfers does not cause or
weaken the crowding-out e¤ect problem. In the opposite case, however, parents can rely on
the formal care because it tends to be a close substitute for the informal care. As the demand
becomes elastic, accordingly parents can reduce their transfers. This again suggests that the
MTD may crowd out parental transfers, even under the exchange motive. In sum, the exact
direction of the e¤ect of the MTD on transfers received is theoretically ambiguous, and must
be determined using empirical analysis.
Indeed, it is a controversial issue whether close substitutes for the informal care exist in
Japan. Family wealth goes disproportionately to the next generation of men, especially the
eldest son, because patriarchy is common practice in many Asian countries (Izuhara 2008). In
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exchange, the eldest son tacitly provides care to his parent in Japan. Japan, however, faces the
most rapid growth in the proportion of elderly in the population in the world. Reecting the
heavy burden of care service provided by traditional families to elderly people, the long-term
care insurance (LTCI) system has been introduced to promote a formal care service through
a market approach as part of the socialization of care since 2001 (Abe 2009; Izuhara 2004).
Izuhara (2008) suggested that the link between childrens support and transfers are increasingly
being broken in Japan. Abe (2009), however, claimed that the LTCI have reduced burden on
families at a fairly small level. In fact, the LTCI system aims to encourage not institutional care
but rather home-based care. It is intended that home-based care provide senior people with
care from their family at home with some assistance from professional care service providers.
Abe (2009) demonstrated that professional care services at home are utilized by households
with care needs, yet, it only serves as a minor supplement to familial care.
3 Mortgage tax deduction
The MTD allows home-buying households to deduct a percentage of their mortgage balance
from their income taxes. For example, any household that purchased and dwelled in a home
in 2002 are eligible for a tax credit equal to 1 percent of their mortgage balance (Table 1).
However, there are two limitations: only the rst 50 million yen of a mortgage balance can be
used as a tax o¤set and the tax credit can only be claimed for the rst 10 years.
As shown in Table 1, the MTD has been revised several times in the 2000s. From 2002
to 2009, the applicable period of the MTD remained the same. However, from 2005 to 2008,
deduction rates in the last several years were lower than the rst several years. During this
period, the maximum limits were also lowered. In 2009, the MTD returned to the same level
as in the period 2002 to 2004.
In the following section, considering the time-series di¤erences in the availability of the
MTD, we create a variable that captures household-level di¤erences in deductions. This will
ensure su¢ cient variation in MTD availability.
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4 Data and empirical model
The data come from the customer survey collected by the Japan Federation of Housing Or-
ganizations (JHO). Its members consist of various housing suppliers in Japan.3 The JHO
distributes a questionnaire to home builders whose customers bought a newly built detached
house in the three major metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka, and four provincial
cities of Sapporo, Sendai, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka. The Tokyo metropolitan area includes
Saitama, Tokyo Metropolitan, Chiba, and Kanagawa prefectures; the Nagoya metropolitan
area includes Gifu, Aichi, and Mie prefectures; and the Osaka metropolitan area includes Ky-
oto, Osaka, Hyogo, and Nara prefectures. Although the observations are limited to the above
areas, the number of newly built owner-occupied houses accounts for approximately 46.6% of
such houses in Japan (the 2008 Housing Starts, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism, Japan (MLIT)). The JHO conducts this survey every year and collects micro-
level cross-sectional data on approximately 3,000 home-buying households. We pooled the
data for 2002 to 2009. The number of observations in the full sample is 2,747 in 2002; 2,852
in 2003; 2,658 in 2004; 3,513 in 2005; 3,403 in 2006; 3,028 in 2007; 2,811 in 2008; and 3,220 in
2009. Screening the data for complete information on the selected variables produces a sample
of 24,232 observations, which represents 92.4% of the full sample.
Home builders do ask their customers to report transfers received, total earned income
of household members, and mortgage size. From the amount of the loan, we can attempt
to calculate the present value of the total deductions for household i who built a house in
region j in year y , Di;j;y (hereafter we omit the subscript j and y, for simplicity).4 First, let
us dene the original loan amount of household i as Li. Suppose that all households make
a constant interest payment on the mortgage loan of  percent for a 30-year term. The 2011
Survey of Housing Market issued by MLIT Japan reported that the average period of mortgage
3Enterprises of various sizes are members of the JHO, not only the large enterprises but also the medium
and small enterprises. Various kinds of construction methodologies for housing suppliers are also included, e.g.,
prefabricated construction suppliers, wooden home suppliers, two-by-four home builders, and foreign-designed
homes. Details about the JHO are available at http://www.judanren.or.jp/english/index.html (accessed on
March 15, 2011).
4For details of the calculation method see Brueggeman and Fisher (2006).
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repayment is approximately 30 years. Then, the relation between the monthly payment, MPi,
and the present value of Li can be written as follows:
Li =MPi
360X
k=1
1
(1 + r)k
:
where r = =12 and there are 360 months outstanding on the loan. For , we use the average
of the 10-year xed-rate mortgage rate, which is o¤ered by Japanese city banks.
The monthly payment can be rewritten as follows:
MPi =
r  (1 + r)1230  Li
(1 + r)1230   1 :
Then, the mortgage balance after n years, Bi;n, can be described as:
Bi;n =MPi
(1 + r)12(30 n)   1
r  (1 + r)12(30 n) :
Note that the tax credit is not applied to both the whole mortgage balance and the whole
borrowing period from Table 1. Namely, there is an upper limit for the mortgage balance,
B, and the deduction period is the rst 10 years. Eventually, we assume that the amount of
deduction, Di, can be represented as:
Di =
10X
n=1
nB

i;n;
where n is the deduction rate, and
Bi;n = Bi;n; if Bi;n  B
= B; otherwise.
In the empirical stage, we must account for the fact that transfers can only be nonnegative
and that a substantial fraction of children do not receive any transfers. To address this problem,
the literature has estimated both the probit and the tobit models: the probit model is used to
analyze the extensive margin (the propensity to transfer), whereas the tobit model has been
used to consider the intensive margin (the amount of the transfer received). Let us dene T i
as an unobserved latent variable measuring transfers to household i. The latent variable is
assumed to have a linear form:
T i = Di +Xi + "i; (1)
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where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, and  and  are coe¢ cients to be estimated. The
sign of  focuses of the main relationship examined in this paper, because the crowding-out
e¤ect tends to occur when its sign is negative. The error term "i is assumed to be normal and
independently distributed with a zero mean and constant variance. Then in the probit model,
the latent variable determines the outcome observed for the zero-one dummy ti:
ti = 1; if T i > 0
= 0; otherwise.
On the other hand, in the tobit model, the nonnegative value Ti is dened as follows:
Ti = T

i ; if T

i > 0
= 0; otherwise.
However, there may be a problem of potential endogeneity of Di in Eq. (1). The estimates
of  could be biased upward, when children increase their loan amount, because they expect to
receive parental transfers. Upward bias may also occur when unobservable characteristics may
be positively correlated with both T i and Di. For example, parental income is not available
in our data. Parents with high incomes are more likely to provide assistance to their children
regardless of their transfer motives (Cox 1987). At the same time, children are more likely to
borrow from banks when their rich parents cosign, and are more likely to claim deductions
from their income. These problems, consequently, tend to underestimate the crowding-out
e¤ect.
Similar to Juarez (2009) and Gerardi and Tsai (2010), we use the instrumental variable
(IV) approach to address this concern. The rst stage regression for both the IV probit and
the IV tobit models, is:
Di =  Di +Xi + ui; (2)
where Di is an instrument, which is explained below. The error terms ("i; ui) are zero-mean
normally distributed and independent of Xi. Eqs. (1) and (2) are estimated jointly by maxi-
mum likelihood.
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As instruments, we use the average deduction amount, Di, as follows:
Di =
P
D i
N   1 ;
where
P
D i is the present value of the total deduction except for household i in a region
in a year, and N is the number of observations in the region in the year. On the one hand,
the average deduction amount is expected to have an inuence on the deduction amount of
each household, because both follow the same structure. On the other hand, the average
deduction amount may have only indirect impacts on transfers received through their e¤ect on
the household-level deduction amount, because children tend to care about their own deduction
amount, rather than the average deduction amount. As a result, Di seems to be a valid
instrument, which includes the information on the MTD.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample. It indicates that approxi-
mately 18 percent of observations receive a positive transfer. On average, children receive 1.94
million yen from their parents. The minimum transfer amount is zero, because a considerable
fraction of children do not receive any parental transfers.
The variables included in Table 2 are all included in our set of control variables to reduce
the omitted variable bias. The average household income and the age of a householder are
relatively high, reecting the fact that our data only include owners of detached houses in
urban areas.
If parents transfer based on the exchange motive, the substitutes for informal care will
inuence transfer behavior. To control for this e¤ect, we use long-term care (LTC) capacity
in each prefecture, which is obtained from the Survey of Institutions and Establishments for
Long-term Care (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan). LTC capacity may proxy
the accessibility to formal care, because the numerator (the number of hospital beds) may
reect the supply side of market care services, while the denominator (elderly population) may
reect the demand side for them. In addition to LTC capacity, we consider professional care
services in the home in each prefecture, data for which are also obtained from the above survey.
We create a variable called home helper which equals the number of home helpers divided by
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the elderly population. Unfortunately, we cannot obtain the parentsresidential location from
the data. We thus assume that children and parents reside in the same region. According to
the 2004 wave of the Keio Household Panel Survey, approximately 80 percent of senior parents
and adult children dwell in the same prefecture in Japan.5
Because a detached house is built on a separate parcel of land, homeowners often acquire
land when they acquire a house. Parents may consider the land price in determining the
transfer. We thus control the land price using the Land Price Survey conducted by prefectural
governments. We also include four location dummies, comprising: Tokyo area (reference);
Nagoya area; Osaka area and provincial cities, and eight-year dummies. If there are policies
targeted at promoting parental transfers or encouraging homeownership that were implemented
in the same sample periods, it may also have a¤ected the receipt of transfers. Although it is
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the full set of reasons, we control these inuences
by year dummies.
We also check whether transfers received vary between sociodemographic characteristics.
These can identify the di¤erence in parental motives to transfer to some degree. First, we
examine household income. Generally, low-income households face liquidity constraints (En-
gelhardt and Mayer 1998). We thus consider whether parents whose children are low income
behave based more on the altruistic motive than the exchange motive to realize the childrens
dream of homeownership. On the other hand, parents whose children earn high incomes tend
to su¤er from eliciting their childrens service. We thus assume that parentsbehavior is based
more on the exchange motive in this case. To consider this di¤erence, we estimate two equa-
tions: one uses household incomes below the 25th percentile (< 25th percentile); the other uses
above the 25th percentile (25th percentile +). Table 3 shows that the lowest income group is
more likely to receive transfers on both the extensive and the intensive margins.
Second, we divide the sample into age: householders aged younger than 40 years (< 40)
and aged 40 years or more (40 +). Parents of younger adult children are less likely to have
a health deterioration issue, because they are likely to be younger themselves. In this sense,
5The Keio Household Panel Survey is available at http://www.pdrc.keio.ac.jp/en/ (accessed on March 15,
2011).
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they may transfer without expecting their childrens informal care, i.e. they act as an altruist.
While, parents of older adult children tend to need nursing care, they behave based more on the
exchange motive. Table 3 demonstrates that younger householders are more likely to receive
transfers on both the extensive and the intensive margins than older householders.
Third, households are classied by tenure status prior to acquiring a new detached house.
Mayer and Engelhardt (1996) hypothesized that repeat home buyers who acquire a house
in major metropolitan areas in the US are less likely than rst-time buyers to be nancial
constrained, because the former can use the equity from their previous home. Indeed, their
descriptive statistics indicate that gifts for home purchase are substantially less frequent for
repeat buyers. While we do not have information regarding whether or not households are
rst-time home buyers, we do have information on whether households previously dwelled in
rental dwellings, of which we expect that a relatively high proportion of them are rst-time
buyers. Table 3 suggests that former renters (former renter) are more likely to receive transfers
on both the extensive and the intensive margins than former homeowners (former owner).
Former renters have less household income and are younger, which have similar characteristics
to rst-time home buyers according to Mayer and Engelhardt (1996). We expect that parents
may behave altruistically when their children dwelled in rental dwellings previously.
Last, we focus on living arrangements: whether the respondent lives with their parents (with
parents) or not (without parents). Like Taiwan, Japanese adult children frequently live with
their parents (Gerardi and Tsai 2010). The literature suggests that sharing a home arises from
the exchange motive (Tomassini et al. 2003; Yamada 2006; Yin 2010). Namely, the exchange
motive suggests that living together makes it possible for children to spend large amounts
of time providing nursing care, and children thus expect a return from their parents in the
future. Although co-residence may a¤ect parentstransfer behavior, there are no substantial
di¤erences between the two groups in Table 3.
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5 Estimation results
Table 4 demonstrates the estimation results that use the full sample. According to the probit
model, children that benet from the MTD are less likely to receive monetary transfers from
their parents, indicating a housing subsidy tends to crowd out parental transfers. The estimated
marginal e¤ect, which evaluates the marginal e¤ect of each observation and averages their
e¤ect, suggests that a 1 percent increase in the deduction amount decreases the likelihood of
receiving transfers from parents by approximately 8.4 percent.
Other explanatory variables suggest that children are statistically more likely to receive
parental transfers when their household income is low and when householders are young, which
are consistent with the literature (Cirman 2006; Engelhardt and Mayer 1998). The coe¢ cient
of LTC capacity has a signicantly negative sign, indicating children are less likely to receive
transfer when access of seniors to LTC institutions is improved. This may suggest that parents
can rely on formal care, and consequently reduce intergenerational transfers to induce informal
care. The coe¢ cient of home helper, however, has a signicantly positive sign which runs
contrary to our expectation. An explanation for this unexpected result can be found in Abe
(2009). As mentioned in Section 2, Abe (2009) demonstrated that professional care services
at home only serves as a minor supplement to familial care. This indicates that parents who
rely on professional care at home must rely on informal care at home as well, accordingly the
likelihood of transfers being received increases. Finally, tighter land markets, as indicated by
regional land prices, tend to discourage the propensity of transfers received.
As expected, the IV probit estimate demonstrates the estimated value of deduction is larger
in absolute terms than in the probit model, but is statistically insignicant. The rst-stage
coe¢ cient estimates associated with the instrumental variable also has a signicantly positive
sign. The Wald test statistic, however, is su¢ ciently small, suggesting the nonrejection of the
null hypothesis that deduction is an endogenous variable. Therefore, it seems that the probit
model is valid rather than the IV probit model.
In the tobit model it appears that the deduction amount generated by the MTD has a
12
signicantly negative e¤ect on the amount of transfers received; again the housing subsidy
tends to crowd out parental transfers. The marginal e¤ect, conditional on receiving a positive
transfer, of the tobit model indicates that a one million yen increase in deductions leads to
a 95.7 million yen reduction in parental transfers, indicating that the crowding-out e¤ect is
substantially large. The signs of the other coe¢ cients are the same in those in the probit model.
Income, however, is insignicant in this case. The IV Tobit cannot reject the nonexistence of
crowding-out because of large standard errors. However, the Wald test statistic of the IV tobit
model is again su¢ ciently small. The tobit model thus seems appropriate compared with the
IV tobit model.
Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation results, which use the subsample. However, we
only report the probit and the tobit models because the coe¢ cients of deduction may not
su¤er from serious bias, as mentioned earlier. Let us start with a discussion about household
income in Table 5. The marginal e¤ects of deduction for low-income households are large in
absolute value on both the extensive and the intensive margins. Namely, children with low
income are less likely to receive transfers and to receive a smaller transfer. This is most likely
because parents that behave based on relatively strong altruistic preferences are more likely to
recognize the benet of the MTD. However, the coe¢ cient of income for low-income households
is inconsistent with our prediction: it may be negative if parents behave as altruists.
When we look at the di¤erence in household head age in Table 5, the marginal e¤ects of
deduction are more pronounced in younger children on both the extensive and the intensive
margins. This suggests that parents who behave based on relatively strong altruistic preferences
are again more sensitive to the benet of the MTD, results in a stronger crowding-out e¤ect. In
both the probit and the tobit models, the estimated e¤ects of LTC capacity and home helper
for children aged 40 or more are large in magnitude compared with those for children aged less
than 40. This appears to indicate that parents who are more likely to have health deterioration
issues tend to be more responsive to formal care services.
From Table 6, we nd that the crowding-out e¤ect for previous renters is substantially
stronger than former owners on both the extensive and the intensive margins. Similar to the
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above cases, this may reect the fact that their parents behave based on relatively strong
altruistic preferences. The larger coe¢ cients of income in absolute value for previous renters
suggest that renters with low income are more likely to receive transfers and to receive a larger
transfer conditional on receiving a positive one because their parents tend to be more sensitive
to the borrowing constraints of children. Increases in land prices have a di¤erent inuence on
transfer behavior. For previous homeowners, an increase in land prices increases their equity.
Previous owners, therefore, are less likely to receive transfers and to receive a smaller transfer
as indicated by signicantly negative sign for land price in both the probit and the tobit models.
In contrast, for previous renters, it is di¢ cult to acquire a new dwelling when land prices are
high. This may be a reason why the coe¢ cients of land price become insignicant in both
models.
The empirical results in Table 6 also demonstrate that the marginal e¤ects of deduction on
both the extensive and the intensive margins is slightly smaller in absolute value for children
who live with their parents. Consistent with the above subsample analysis, parents that behave
based on the relatively strong exchange motive are less likely to be sensitive to the benet of
the MTD, resulting in a weaker crowding-out e¤ect. The coe¢ cients of LTC capacity and
home helper for children who live with parents are insignicant, suggesting parents tend not
to rely on formal care presumably because their co-resident children can care for them.
6 Conclusion
This paper hypothesized that children tend to lose the opportunity to receive monetary trans-
fers earmarked for home purchases from their parents when a housing subsidy is provided
by the government. To conrm this hypothesis, we empirically tested whether a deduction
amount, which is derived from the MTD, has a negative impact on transfers, using a sample
of home buyers in urban areas of Japan in the 2000s. To our best knowledge, this is the
rst paper that empirically examined the crowding-out e¤ect of public transfers, which target
prospective home buyers, on intergenerational transfers. Our ndings supported the evidence
of a crowding-out e¤ect stemming from the MTD in Japan on both the extensive and the
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intensive margins. In particular, the estimates of the intensive margin suggested a substantial
crowding-out e¤ect: a one million yen increase in childrens deductions leads to 0.957 mil-
lion yen reduction in parental transfers. Crowding out suggests that the impact of a housing
subsidy is smaller than perceived by the government.
We also examined subsamples that categorize children into two groups: those parents with
a relatively strong altruistic motive and a relatively weak exchange motive, and the second
subsample includes those parents with a relatively weak altruistic motive and a relatively
strong exchange motive. The empirical results suggested that the degree of crowding-out
e¤ect di¤ered between subsamples. Namely, the crowding-out e¤ect is strengthened when
the relatively strong altruistic motive and the relatively weak exchange motive, because these
parents are presumably more sensitive to the benet of the MTD. These empirical results
have the following implications. On the one hand, childrens welfare may be una¤ected by the
MTD, if parents behave based on the relatively strong altruistic motive. This is because the
housing subsidy, which tends to induce relatively large reduction in both the extensive and the
intensive margins associated with, only works as a substitute for parental support. Childrens
welfare, however, may be increased by the MTD, if parents behave based on based on the
relatively strong exchange motive. Because the crowding-out e¤ect is relatively small, the
MTD appears to alleviate the borrowing constraint of children. Moreover, because childrens
dream of homeownership is likely to rely on public transfers, the MTD allows children to
provide fewer services to their parent.
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Table 1: Mortgage tax deduction rules in the 2000s  
Year 
Credit rate 
 (%) 
Maximum mortgage balance 
(million yen) 
Deduction period 
(years) 
2002 1 50 10 
2003 1 50 10 
2004 1 50 10 
2005 
1 
40 
First 8  
0.5 Last 2 
2006 
1 
30 
First 7 
0.5 Last 3 
2007 
1 
25 
First 6 
0.5 Last 4 
2008 
1 
20 
First 6 
0.5 Last 4 
2009 1 50 10 
 
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the full sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Children receive transfer (dummy) 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Transfer (million yen) 1.94 6.30 0.00 294.62 
Deduction (million yen) 1.68 1.11 0.00 4.99 
Average deduction (million yen) 1.81 0.24 1.42 2.44 
Income (million yen) 8.26 5.73 0.00 199.20 
Age (years) 42.77 11.65 20.00 92.00 
LTC capacity (1,000 beds/100,000 elderly) 2.37 0.33 1.70 3.26 
Home helper (1,000person/100,000 elderly) 1.58 0.41 0.81 2.67 
Land price (ten thousand yen) 13.37 7.67 3.68 36.05 
Nagoya area (dummy) 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Osaka area (dummy) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Provincial city (dummy) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
2003 (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
2004 (dummy) 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
2005 (dummy) 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
2006 (dummy) 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
2007 (dummy) 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
2008 (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
2009 (dummy) 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
  
Observations  24,232  
 
  
Table 3: Mean values of the subsample 
 Income Age 
Variable < 25th percentile 25th percentile + < 40 40 + 
Children receive transfer (dummy) 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.11 
Transfer (million yen) 2.23 1.85 2.63 1.26 
Deduction (million yen) 1.39 1.82 2.06 1.36 
Average deduction (million yen) 1.93 1.93 1.94 1.92 
Income (million yen) 4.19 9.62 7.10 9.43 
Age (years) 41.65 43.14 33.59 51.98 
  
Observations  6,058 18,174 12,144 12,088 
 Former tenure Types of living arrangement 
Variable Former renter Former owner Without parents With parents 
Children receive transfer (dummy) 0.25 0.11 0.19 0.17 
Transfer (million yen) 2.54 1.22 1.91 2.09 
Deduction (million yen) 2.01 1.36 1.71 1.73 
Average deduction (million yen) 1.94 1.92 1.94 1.91 
Income (million yen) 7.55 9.12 8.10 8.92 
Age (years) 36.75 50.05 42.15 45.25 
  
Observations  13,273 10,959 19,453 4,779 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Empirical results of the full sample    
 Probit IV Probit Tobit IV Tobit 
Deduction –0.201*** –0.301 –4.665*** –2.023 
 (0.012) (0.412) (0.268) (7.886) 
Income –0.016*** –0.013 –0.150 –0.243 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.099) (0.298) 
Age –0.043*** –0.048*** –0.820*** –0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.017) (0.034) (0.314) 
LTC capacity –0.181*** –0.174** –2.406*** –2.579*** 
 (0.042) (0.053) (0.781) (0.929) 
Home helper 0.164*** 0.155*** 3.099*** 3.324*** 
 (0.047) (0.063) (0.898) (1.121) 
Land price –0.006** –0.005 –0.062 -0.066 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.043) (0.044) 
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal effect –0.084*** –0.122 –0.957*** –0.415 
 [0.004] [0.150] [0.054] [1.622] 
      
IV     
Average deduction   0.200***  0.200*** 
   (0.055)  (0.055) 
Wald statics   0.06  0.11 
   {0.809}  {0.739} 
     
Observations 24,232 24,232 24,232 24,232 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, standard errors in brackets, and p-values in braces  
Marginal effect calculates marginal effect of deduction conditional on it being positive 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Empirical results of the subsample (income and age)    
 Income Age 
 < 25th percentile 25th percentile + < 40 40 + 
Probit     
Deduction –0.307*** –0.185*** –0.302*** –0.119*** 
 (0.032) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) 
Income 0.073*** –0.020*** –0.026*** –0.016*** 
 (0.027) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age –0.048*** –0.041*** –0.023*** –0.049*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
LTC capacity –0.217** –0.168*** –0.144*** –0.220*** 
 (0.086) (0.049) (0.054) (0.068) 
Home helper 0.118 0.174*** 0.153** 0.168** 
 (0.095) (0.055) (0.064) (0.073) 
Land price –0.003 –0.007*** -0.002 –0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Marginal effect –0.131*** –0.078*** –0.181*** –0.029*** 
 [0.013] [0.005] [0.009] [0.004] 
Tobit     
Deduction –6.301*** –4.551*** –6.066*** –3.532*** 
 (0.581) (0.309) (0.313) (0.467) 
Income 1.247*** –0.263* –0.240*** –0.237 
 (0.463) (0.153) (0.068) (0.196) 
Age –0.759*** –0.843*** –0.319*** –1.212*** 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.056) (0.102) 
LTC capacity –1.953 –2.548*** –1.746** –3.601** 
 (1.290) (0.896) (0.849) (1.641) 
Home helper 1.347 3.682*** 2.604*** 3.893** 
 (1.454) (1.121) (1.029) (1.787) 
Land price –0.011 –0.090* 0.023 –0.252*** 
 (0.070) (0.054) (0.051) (0.084) 
Marginal effect –1.438*** –0.901*** –1.483*** –0.592*** 
 [0.131] [0.060] [0.077] [0.077] 
     
Observations 6,058 18,174 12,144 12,088 
All models are controlled by location and year dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and standard errors in brackets  
Marginal effect calculates marginal effect of deduction conditional on it being positive 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively 
Table 6: Empirical results of the subsample (former tenure and types of living arrangement) 
 Former tenure Types of living arrangement 
 Former renter Former owner Without parents With parents 
Probit     
Deduction –0.283*** –0.121*** –0.214*** –0.150*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.024) 
Income –0.031*** –0.009* –0.020*** –0.010 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) 
Age –0.027*** –0.042*** –0.046*** –0.035*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
LTC capacity –0.224*** –0.131* –0.221*** –0.016 
 (0.052) (0.075) (0.047) (0.097) 
Home helper 0.230*** 0.082 0.193** 0.058 
 (0.062) (0.077) (0.054) (0.103) 
Land price –0.003 –0.010*** –0.007** –0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Marginal Effect –0.159*** –0.030*** –0.090*** –0.062*** 
 [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.009] 
Tobit     
Deduction –5.824*** –3.439*** –4.737*** –4.224*** 
 (0.288) (0.505) (0.273) (0.644) 
Income –0.329*** –0.079 –0.217*** –0.023 
 (0.066) (0.156) (0.052) (0.230) 
Age –0.465*** –0.989*** –0.836*** –0.788*** 
 (0.033) (0.087) (0.028) (0.093) 
LTC capacity –2.823*** –1.886 –2.746*** –0.031 
 (0.826) (1.867) (0.817) (2.169) 
Home helper 4.040*** 1.635 3.141*** 2.318 
 (1.012) (1.867) (0.951) (2.382) 
Land price 0.001 –0.223** –0.052 –0.092 
 (0.049) (0.089) (0.047) (0.106) 
Marginal Effect –1.390*** –0.570*** –0.981*** –0.846*** 
 [0.069] [0.083] [0.056] [0.126] 
     
Observations 13,273 10,959 19,453 4,779 
All models are controlled by location and year dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and standard errors in brackets  
Marginal effect calculates marginal effect of deduction conditional on it being positive 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively 
 
